This paper describes an adaptive agent model of rangelands based on concepts of complex adaptive systems. The behavioural and biological processes of pastoralists, regulators, livestock, grass and shrubs are modelled as well as the interactions between these components. The evolution of the rangeland system is studied under different policy and institutional regimes that affect the behaviour and learning of pastoralists, and hence the state of the ecological system.
Introduction
This paper explores the widespread problem of how to avoid a long term decline in productivity in savanna rangelands due to grazing, while still maintaining a livelihood in the short term (Walker 1979, Tothill and Mott 1985) . We deal only with commercial systems, where changes in vegetation structure and soils are common causes of declines in productivity.
The problem arises out of the change from the pattern of vegetation use by wild animals dn open range under which the ecosystem evolved, to the present patterns of use on commercial holdings. The former consisted of intermittent grazing by mobile herds, often of mixed grazers and browsers. Grazing pressure was usually lower than now, and fires relatively frequent. The system was adapted to rainfall that is highly variable in time and space. Under commercial management, the pattern has changed to one of constant, heavy grazing in fenced paddocks, often with permanent drinking water. This can lead to a reduced grass cover, little build up of fuel and infrequent fire. Browsing animals are uncommon, ranches being stocked mainly with sheep or cattle, both primarily grazers. Their feeding generally does not suppress shrubs.
Common consequences are an increase in woody plants, and a decline in grass production per unit of rainfall (Stafford Smith and Pickup, 1992) . These effects are recoverable to an extent, depending on the attributes of the landscape and the reduction of grazing pressure. However, de-stocking is expensive due to income foregone. Factors influencing range managers' decisions include the policy and institutional environment, and financial, forage and animal production considerations. In this paper we focus upon interactions between the policy and institutional environment and pastoralists' decisions. This is because of the potential for effecting widespread changes in range management through adaptive changes in policy and institutional settings (Abel, 1999) .
The evolution of scientific understanding and policy advice for rangelands under grazing has progressed from a rather naive model based on linear, reversible succession (a too-literal interpretation of Clementsian theory), through recognition of hysteresis effects in recovery from loss of potential primary production, to the development of multiple stable state models, a pragmatic version of which is the state-and-transition model (Westoby et al., 1989 ).
An approach that gives useful insights on commercial systems is optimal control theory, in which it is assumed that the manager maximises some index of welfare (usually net income) over a specified time under a given discount rate (eg Per-rings and . The critical assumption is that the manager is maximising a simple objective function, and is willing and able +o adopt optimal patterns of stocking and burning.
An alternative approach, the subject of this paper, is to consider the rangeland, the pastoralists and the policy makers as a complex adaptive system (Holland, 1992; Abel, 1998) .
Complex adaptive systems can be studied by adaptive agent models that deal with a population of diverse and interacting agents (e.g. Janssen, 1998a; . Behavioural rules at the level of individual agents lead to emergent properties at the macro level. Instead of traditional deterministic equilibrium seeking models, adaptive agent models evolve, leading to irreversible structural changes. External and internal disturbances prevent the system reaching equilibrium.
A recent special issue of Science (April, 1999) gives an overview of disciplinary studies of complex (adaptive) systems. In this paper an interdisciplinary, or integrated model is discussed. Integrated models combine simplified versions of expert models of various disciplines (Janssen, 1998b) . They combine social, economic and ecological sub-systems. One purpose of integrated models is to develop principles for managing and adapting to real complex systems.
Our rangeland model consists of ecological and socio-economic sub-systems. The ecological sub-system is a simplified version of more comprehensive models. Relations are empirically based. The socio-economic sub-system describes the "regulator" and the behaviour of pastoralists. The regulator comprises the policy and institutional environment within which pastoralists make management decisions. The socio-economic sub-system is based on theory and evidence from psychology Jager et al., 1999) , cultural anthropology Janssen and de Vries, 1998) , economics (Ellis, 1988; Simon, 1947) , and organisation and management (Roe et al., 1998; Sandford, 1983) . Its political-economic background is in Abel, 1999. Potential decision rules for pastoralists were developed in discussion with experts on rangeland management and simplified for the model. Both the decision-making environment and the pastoralists' decision rules necessarily lack the complexities of real systems. We believe they retain sufficient complexity for the purposes of this paper, which are to: 0 study patterns and emergent properties arising from interactions between the simple decision rules of policy makers and pastoralists and the dynamics of the rangeland; l track and explain the evolution of simulated populations of pastoralists and the condition of the range under different regulatory regimes; l contribute to the development of general principles about management and adaptation in ecosystems.
The paper has four parts: 1) a model of the ecological system, 2) an account of the social and economic system, 3) a description of the overall model and the results of a number of 'experiments' using the model, 4) a final section on the insights gained and the implications for further work.
The Ecological System

Model Description
Essential biophysical variables and their interactions, depicted in Fig 1, are sheep, grasses and woody plants. The model includes one hundred management units (pastoral properties, or ranches) which can be in one of two kinds of land system (Speight, 1988; Walker, 1991) . Half the properties are in a land system with massive red earth soils prone to erosion and surface sealing and supporting grasses and mainly inedible or inaccessible woody plants. This is referred to as the 'mulga' (Acacia anew-a) land system. The other half are in a drier, more calcareous land system with edible, chenopod dwarf shrubs and grasses. The biophysical model is based on Perrings and Walker (1997) , Ludwig et al (1997) and Moore et al. (1997) . It takes into account the growth of grass and woody plants in response to rainfall, and the effects of fire, grazing and browsing. The rates of grass and woody growth are modified by competition between themselves and each other. Smaller, younger woody plants have a greater inhibitive effect on grass growth per unit of woody plant biomass than do larger, older woody plants. To capture the essential dynamics of the system over time, including lag effects, a number of ecological processes are included. It is this set of interacting processes that gives each rangeland its characteristic behaviour, and it is what managers must manage. The processes are:
1. Reduction and recovery of potential primary production.
Change in the productive potential of the rangeland is reflected as a change in maximum possible grass production. Grass growth in response to a unit of rainfall is a function of the ecological state of the system, which is determined in this model by grass biomass itself. If, through heavy grazing, drought or a combination of the two, grass biomass remains below some minimum threshold level for more than one year, there is a decline in potential production (through reduced water infiltration and loss of perennial grasses). The process is represented by a progressive reduction in the maximum potential grass biomass (gmaX) down to some minimum proportion of this value (O-l) depending on the kind of rangeland. Removing grazing pressure after potential primary production has been reduced allows the system to recover, and potential production to increase gradually. The extent and rate of reduced potential primary production as well as the recovery rate (with recovery being generally slower than reduction) are determined by the kind of land system. For the purposes of our model we equate the changes in the parameter 'q' with the loss and re-establishment of the spatial processes described in Tongway and Ludwig 1997. The actual spatial dynamics of run-off, run-on and soil nutrient status that underlie the net effect are much more complex than our model allows.
2. Changes in woody plant density and biomass. 50th the biomass and density (number per unit area) of woody plants are important in the dynamics of the rangeland. We need biomass to calculate browse and the densities of plants in various age classes in order to capture the time course of shrub encroachment and its effects on grass growth. Woody plants are determined initially in terms of density, calculated for four age classes -seedlings, establishing young plants within the grass layer, middle aged and old shrubs.
For all but the seedling age class there is a mortality factor dependent on the amount of woody leaf browsed, rainfall and fire. Individuals move through these age classes with seedlings germinating when rainfall is above a threshold. Establishment of germinated seedlings also depends on the amount of competition from grass and existing woody plants. Leaf biomass is determined from a regression equation averaged for eight shrub species, relating shrub height to leaf biomass (Harrington, 1979) . Seedling contribution to total woody leaf is negligible and ignored.
The intensity of the fire is dependent on the fuel load. The decision to bum is driven by the density of shrubs in the establishing age class and the fuel load at which a pastoralist is prepared to bum. Fuel load is the grass biomass remaining after grazing. It can accumulate to a maximum level, beyond which decomposition more than offsets the rate of accumulation. In the event of a fire the fuel load is removed, grass biomass reduced and shrubs are thinned differentially depending upon their age class and the intensity of the fire.
Livestock and wool dynamics.
The number of sheep changes through births, deaths, sales and purchases. We exclude additional grazing pressure from wild or feral animals (eg kangaroos, goats). Sales and purchases are dealt with in the next section. Mortality and natality are linear functions of the amount of grass and woody browse available for consumption. As forage increases above the amount required to maintain an animal, the growth rate increases to a maximum level. Likewise when forage falls below that required to maintain an animal, death occurs and increases to a maximum rate.
Forage consumption per head of sheep is a constant. We do not include mortalities due to factors other than forage.
Potential wool production declines linearly when green leaf biomass falls below a threshold of 75kg/ha (Freudenberger, 1999 
Model equations
The equations for change in the four state variables, grass biomass (g), density of woody vegetation (4, leaf biomass of woody vegetation (w) and livestock (x) are as follows:
where: grass biomass for property i, adit = the accumulating reduction in potential maximum grass biomass can increase to a maximum of 1 or decline towards 0 depending upon: adltt+l)-adit = rredi. kit -rr,,i.(I-kit) and:
rred i = reduction rate for property i (constant) kit = 0 (normally) or 1, when grass biomass falls below a threshold value (gd) for two consecutive years for property i at time t, Get i = recovery rate for property i (constant), pi= proportion by which gmax can be reduced when potential primary production is at its minimum for property i, Cwg,, = maximum w/g competition coefficient cwmin = minimum w/g competition coefficient diht = density of woody plants for property in height class h (for h = 2-4) at time t calculated as:
where: o= proporti on of grass biomass destroyed by fire
Wool production is calculated as:
where: wpit = wool production for property i at time t,.
q~-= annual average greasy wool production per sheep.
wm(git,wit) = wool production modifier which is set to 1 when available forage (git+O.Wit) is greater than 75kg, otherwise = O.O053.(g, + Bi .W, ) + 0.6
The initial and maximum values of the state values, and the parameter values in the example are presented in Table 1 . 
The Socio-Economic System
Introduction
Social science theory dealing with decision making is divided by scale and discipline.
Psychology addresses personal decisions, anthropology operates at cultural level, sociology is concerned with whole societies, while neo-classical economics deals with economies as if these are separated from society. Linkages between disciplines and scales are at best weak. Thus neoclassical economics uses utility-maximising models that are contradicted by empirical studies of decision making (Simon, 1957; Ormerod, 1994; Thaler, 1994; Loomes, 1998) . In these circumstances we used elements of social science we thought important for our purposes, and which can be included in a formal model. Although formal models cannot include behaviour that approaches the sophistication or subtlety of decisions made by real people, they are clear in their assumptions and the resulting consequences.
Social scientists have used computers to simulate behavioural and social processes since the early 1950's. They are now exploring new ways of modelling human behaviour with techniques such as cellular automata, genetic algorithms and neural networks (Vallacher and Nowak 1994; Gilbert and Doran 1994; Gilbert and Conte 1995; Conte et al. 1997 and Liebrand et al. 1998 ). The general feature of this new work is the use of simulation models of interacting agents to study social processes in simple and complex environments.
Model desciption
Two levels of social behaviour are distinguished, at two different spatial scales: the pastoralists who manage their own land, and a regulator who attempts to influence the behaviour of all the pastoralists in the region.
The pastoralists
The behaviour of pastoralists is based on theories and modeling approaches from bounded rationality (Simon, 1957 (Simon, , 1996 , social psychology (Jager et al. 1999) , and mental models . Decision rules were drawn from empirical and modelling studies (Carman et al., 1998, Foran and Stafford Smith, 1991; Noble; Hodgkinson and Marsden, 1999; Buxton and Stafford Smith, 1996) , and interviews with knowledgeable professionals from CSIRO Wildlife and Ecology.
The population of one hundred pastoralists differ in their financial and cognitive abilities, their perception of time, and in the utility they derive from consumption. Both commercial and life style pastoralists can have long or short time horizons. Those with long time horizons pay more attention to the quality of the rangeland compared to those with a short time horizon. One type of pastoralist is assumed to reach a given level of utility with a relatively low consumption level.
They choose to live in the rangeland because they enjoy the lifestyle. The other type, the commercial pastoralist, is motivated purely by the financial returns from the land. We acknowledge that this is a great simplification, and that many of the factors that we know drive behaviour are omitted (family size, skill levels, school fees, external income and so on). The level of simplification is appropriate for our purposes.
To determine the level of consumption we take into account pastoralists' financial resources and utility functions, as related to life style. Financial resources in any year comprise net income for that year plus any surplus carried forward from the previous year. We assume that a pastoralist consumes a minimum amount that leads to a minimum level of utility Uen.
When financial resources are above this minimum level, utility rises with consumption. Any financial resources above a certain level (Rmax) ($/ha), are consumed and increase utility.
The utility function, Ui, of pastoralist i is therefore:
with Ci=max(exp(Ue,)"ai, cf,i * inci, Ri,t -R,,) where consumption is denoted by C ($/ha/yr), and parameter a determines the degree of satisfaction per unit of consumption. Ri ($/ha) is the financial resources (cash held) of pastoralist i, in a particular year; cr i, 7 consumption rate, is the percentage of the yearly income. An amount 1-cri, is carried forward to the next year to contribute to financial resources. The term inci 7
($/ha/yr) is yearly gross margin from sale of products. Depreciation and fixed costs are ignored.
Financial resources change due to revenue from wool, sheep purchases and sales, debt repayments and consumption. Due to uncertainties in rainfall, grass biomass, wool price, and growth of the sheep flock actual income may differ significantly from expected income.
Pastoralists may have debt repayments, dbi, and this debt increases when financial resources are negative, in line with the interest rate, int. A pastoralist may decide to buy sheep for the price of psb each if the actual stocking level xi is not equal to the expected stocking level E[xi]t. The pastoralist may also sell surplus sheep at a price pss (<p&) ($/sheep) each if the property or the sheep are in poor condition.
The net income, Inci, is defined as
Where: x is the stocking rate; wpmaX the amount of wool yield per sheep (kg); and pw is the wool price (per kg) minus the variable costs of production, (per kg). Net income, savings brought forward and consumption constitute financial resources.
The expected stocking level of sheep at the beginning of period t is the lesser of:
a the flock size resulting from natural increase l the flock size that would consume the expected biomass of grass (g) at the specified consumption rate per head, cf.
Debt repayment is assumed to be related to the interest rate, int, and the pay back period PBP (years), and only holds when financial resources, RI, are negative. Debt payments make it difficult for pastoralists to return to positive resources again. When negative resources fall below a tolerable debt level Dmax, then the pastoralist is assumed to go bankrupt.
We consider two cognitive processes affecting stocking decisions. If a pastoralist is satisfied (s)he is assumed to process information automatically and show habitual behaviour. We assume dissatisfaction when growth rate of stock is poor, or when grass biomass or financial resources fall below certain levels. Dissatisfaction stimulates the pastoralist to consider changing management. The pastoralist may still be seen as an economically rational agent who does not spend scarce time and cognitive abilities on complex problem solving when (s)he is already satisfied (Simon, 1957) . From a psychological viewpoint, the hierarchical nature of personal constructs mean that individuals change their minds on major matters somewhat reluctantly (Kelly, 1955) .
Decisions on stocking rate
So long as financial and ecological conditions are satisfactory, the pastoralist will continue to stock at a rate linearly related to expected grass biomass (E(gi)) and consumption rate (cf).
The sheep graze all the allowable proportion (ms) of the expected biomass. The number of sheep is that which fully consumes the maximum allowable proportion of grass biomass, and the pastoralists differ with respect to their perceptions of this proportion (ms). Equations are:
The expected rainfall, E[rfJ (mm/yr), is assumed to be a moving average over the last 5 years. A refinement of the model could be the introduction of different forecasting techniques. Some pastoralists use high tech information on weather forecasts, while other wait and see. The parameter gr is an expected growth rate of grass as defined below.
Mental model theory proposes that because humans necessarily abstract from complex information, mental models cannot be faithful mirrors of reality (Abel, 1998) . Pastoralists' mental models were therefore constructed for our simulation so they had imperfect understanding. Theory also predicts that changes in mental models to accommodate contradictions between the mental model and incoming information are made somewhat reluctantly (Kelly, 1955) . Therefore a pastoralist will only update his or her mental model as defined below if dissatisfaction with financial or ecological conditions exceeds a threshold. If dissatisfied by range condition, they will reduce stocking rate. We simulate destocking by assuming another parameterization of the linear relation, where ds c ms.
If the pastoralist is dissatisfied because of negative financial resources, (s)he uses the msequation for the stocking rate. If both the financial and the ecological conditions are poor, the financial situation is assumed to take priority.
Fire management
On mulga rangelands, pastoralists bum when the amount of young woody weeds (yww) exceeds a certain threshold level yww (kg/ha), and when enough fuel ( grass), is available. The threshold level yww is an individual characteristic of the pastoralist representing his or her understanding of fire management. Pastoralists who never use fire, because of its effect on short-term pasture availability, hence income, have high thresholds. Pastoralists who use fire intensively to reduce woody weeds have low thresholds.
Updating mental models
?astoralists who are financially or ecologically dissatisfied seek new ways of increasing utility and are assumed to update their mental models. Values of parameters in the pastoralists' mental models of the rangeland system are modified accordingly. The parameter gri t denotes the -, expected growth rate of grass in relation to rainfall, assuming constant competition from shrubs.
According to the mental model, the expected grass growth does not change through small changes in shrubs.
To determine the growth rate of grass in the mental model, we first assume that no burning occurs and that grazing is zero. Then we can write grass biomass g (kg/ha) as a function of the biomass of the previous period plus grass growth Ag gi,t = gi,t-1 + &i t ?
where grass growth is dependent on grass biomass, the actual rainfall, rfit , and a number of parameters and variables related to shrub dynamics and potential primary production.
We now can rewrite grass biomass as git = &t-l (l+Vi,t p (l-Cm &nax -Cwg Wmax)) bb
we assume now that gr= p (l-c,, gmx -cwg wmax) which can be assumed to be constant in the mental model of the pastoralist, which is now:
The expected rainfall modifier value depends on the expected rainfall, which is an average value of an historical record, say 5 years. Note that grass growth in reality follows equation 18, where the competition effect of woody weed on grass is variable as defined in the ecological model.
The grass growth in the mental model is determined using expected rainfall instead of actual rainfall (eq. 19), and a constant value of the competition effect from the last update of the mental model.
"Renewal" of pastoralists
If the financial resources of a pastoralist drop below a certain threshold value D,, , the maximum tolerable debt level, we assume the pastoralist goes bankrupt and leaves the system.
The land may be acquired by a pastoralist already in the system, or by a new pastoralist with a random set of cognitive characteristics. We assume that the higher the financial resources of a particular pastoralist, the higher the chance that the renewed agent has the same characteristics as the "fittest" pastoralist, otherwise a new pastoralist with random characteristics is chosen. This is implemented as in the following equation This algorithm has some similarities with genetic algorithms (Goldberg, 1989; Holland, 1992; Mitchell, 1996) . Genetic algorithms simulate the adaptive processes of natural systems.
They have a population of agents who produce offspring that are similar but not identical to their parents. The number of offspring that an agent produces is determined by a fitness function. In our model, the "fitness" of the pastoralists is related to their financial stock. If it becomes too low the pastoralist "dies". If other pastoralists are "fit" enough the fittest acquires the land, otherwise a random new pastoralist comes into the system which may bring in a new management style. This process will lead to an evolution of the characteristics of the pastoralists. Given the social and physical environmental conditions pastoralists with certain characteristics will come to dominate during the simulation. A key question in this regard is; which characteristics dominate under which types of social and physical environmental conditions? An important variable in the social environment of the pastoralists is the type of regulation policy.
The regulator
The regulator in our model is a very simple representation of government. In line with the notion of different cultural perspectives (Schwartz and Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990; Rayner, 1990) , we distinguish three different types of regulator: conservation, stabilisation and free market. A change in "regulator" may in reality reflect a change in policy style, rather than an actual change in the administration.
A conservation policy aims to protect the ecosystem from negative influences of human activities. We assume that this policy causes pastoralists to destock their property when the grass biomass falls below a certain threshold (say 150 kg/ha).
The stabilization type of policy tries to maximize the long-term welfare of society by balancing range condition with income. If rainfall drops below 200 mm in a year, all pastoralists receive a grant of { (ms-ds)*E[gr]/cf } * 15$/ha provided they (partly) destock.
The free market policy does not intervene, leaving pastoralists responsible for managing land in good and bad times.
Change of regulation policy
Abel (1999) discussed regional, state and national influences on policies and institutions affecting these rangelands. These complexities are not included here. Instead we explored interactions among rangelands, pastoralists and regulators on the assumption that the conditions of rangelands and pastoralists were the sole determinants of policy style. Similar experiments have been performed for climate change (Janssen, 1998b; Janssen and de Vries, 1998) and lake eutrophication (Janssen and Carpenter, 1999) . We define thresholds which, when exceeded, lead to a change in regulation. The first is related to opportunity cost expressed as the amount of Income per ha that could be earned at a stocking rate at which all grass is eaten. Wool price also determines this opportunity cost. The second threshold is related to ecological condition, the percentage of properties which have a grass biomass below a minimum amount of 200 kg/ha for mulga, and 150 kg/ha for chenopod.
For each type of regulation we defined conditions in which the regulator maintains or changes policy.
The conservation policy aims at maintaining the initial state of the environment which was "good". If the percentage of properties in good condition remains below 60%, the conservation policy continues. If the percentage of properties in good condition rises above 60% policies change. The free market policy is adopted when opportunity cost is more than 2$/ha. If this cost is less, a stability policy of policy is applied.
If the free market policy is already in effect, it continues a free market regulation when the so long as opportunity cost is more than l$/ha. Otherwise one of the other policies is adopted. A conservation policy is adopted if the percentage of properties in good condition is below 60%, otherwise stability policies are employed.
If a stability policy is in force, it continues as long as no extreme circumstances occur. It changes to conservation when the percentage of properties in good condition drops below 50%, or to free market when the lost opportunities are above 2$/ha.
Results
Introduction
In this section we describe a number of experiments. First, we determine the optimal values of the behavioural rules for a one-property system. Then we analyse the social, economic and ecological consequences of applying each policy style during runs in which the style does not change in response to changing conditions. Next we run experiments in which the policy style changes according to the rules described above.
Historical yearly median rainfall and wool price data from 1986 to 1997 are used for each rangeland. Wool prices are in real terms. Our data cover only the last century. As the model runs are 200 years, rainfall and wool price data are repeated, but a price peak caused by the Korean War (1950s) was removed from the first 100 years (see Figure 4) . iinearity, we used a large number of starting points for the runs (200) for a single property in each of the mulga and chenopod rangelands, and the best solutions are given in Table 2 .
In general, short periods of intensive stocking, followed by a period of recovery characterise the optimal solutions. This flip-flop behaviour of stocking is most extreme for the chenopod type of property, because mulga is more sensitive to intensive grazing, which leads to shrub increase and reduced potential primary production. The a values are low for mulga, which means pastoralists are mainly commercial (high minimum consumption level). The high savings rate, l-c,, and the frequent use of fire suggest a long time horizon during decision making. The chenopod rangeland case is different. The low cc value combined with a low savings rate suggests a lifestyle pastoralist with a short time horizon.
The stocking rate, grass biomass and income from mulga rangeland are about twice those from the chenopod type. In the optimal case, the pastoralist burns about once a decade in the mulga type.
Figures 5 and 6 depict the yearly income, grass biomass and shrub biomass for the optimal case. The periodic flipping of high and low stocking leads to huge variation in yearly income and grass biomass. On mulga rangeland, burning limits woody growth. On chenopod rangeland, shrubs have natural patterns of growth and decline. Zgure 6: Net Income, grass biomass and shrub biomass, chenopod rangeland.
As an additional experiment, we repeated the previous optimisation runs, but used a discount rate of 5% on the yearly net income instead of the 0% discount rate of the previous exercise. The stocking rate is even more unstable, varying to an extreme between zero and a rate at which all grass is consumed. The threshold of grass biomass that determines the change from or to destocking is lower when returns are discounted, so destocking occurs at lower sheep densities.
The threshold for fire management is higher so there is less burning. Pastoralists have lowerincome levels but consume almost their whole income (high cT values). The discounted income is only slightly lower for the chenopod case, but significantly lower for the mulga type of rangeland. In the case of mulga, the grass biomass is much lower, and the woody weed is much higher than the same indicators in Table 2 . Moreover, potential primary production is reduced. 
System dynamics under diflerent forms of regulation
Ln the optimisation experiments perfect foresight was assumed. In this section we use the adaptive rules. Initially, behavioural rules are distributed randomly among pastoralists.
Unexpected changes in rainfall and wool prices cause some pastoralists to go bankrupt. They are replaced by new pastoralists as described earlier. After 200 years we derive a population of pastoralists who performed well in the face of uncertainty.
To explore the effects of regulation policy on rangeland and the evolution of pastoralists we ran 3 experiments, one for each policy type, each with 100 properties: 50 mulga, 50 chenopod. Each experiment was run 100 times with random new initial parameter values of the behavioural rules. A weighted average parameter value of the 100 runs was calculated for properties on each range type (Table 4) (Table 5) . For the mulga case, stocking rates and income levels are much higher under a conservation regime, compared to free market and stability policy styles.
Woody weed and reduced levels of potential primary production are on average much lower.
The conservation policy outperforms the other two types of regulation on these criteria. On chenopod rangeland a stability regime is preferred since it derived extra income from drought relief for destocking, although the system is robust enough to cope with drought years. The condition of the chenopod rangeland does not differ significantly between the different types of regulation. To measure the effectiveness of the learning process the parameter values of Table 4 are used as input for a 200 yr run of a one-property model under the three different types of regulation (Table 6 ). For mulga, the pastoralist who evolves under a free market regulation leads in general to the highest net income, and good range condition. Net income is somewhat less under a stability regime, where a significant part of income is from drought relief. Surprisingly, net income is much less under a conservation policy, and range condition is worse compared to the other two regimes, with less grass and more woody weed. This can be explained by the higher intensity of stocking which reduced the grass biomass. For chenopod rangeland, the stabilization type of regulation leads to the highest income levels, although the differences between policies are smaller than those for the mulga.
Why does the conservation policy favour the evolution of pastoralists who perform worse than those who evolved under free markets? This can be explained by the fact that obligatory destocking reduces the learning potential of the pastoralists. Pastoralists who follow a risky stocking strategy do not "survive" under a free market. They do survive under the conservation policy, whose obligatory destocking policy reduces the chance of destroying the property.
However, the free market policy leads to better performing pastoralists, condition of the rangland is worse during the learning period compared to the conservation policy.
The stabilisation policy also reduced learning, but not as much as obligatory destocking.
However, a drought relief policy does not improve the condition of the rangeland during the 200 years as compared to the free market regime.
These results lead to the question of what type of policy and institutional environment permits or stimulates learning while maintaining rangeland condition during the learning process. We explore this question in the next section where we let the style of policy change over time. 
Changing management styles
In simulations where the policy style of the regulators is allowed to change, each regulator is confronted with measures of system performance. This leads to changes in regulation styles.
When the system starts under the stabilisation regulator, the high stocking rate rapidly decreases the amount of grass biomass to such a degree that the conservation regulator takes over for a brief period. The system recovers. Unexploited opportunities then allow the free market policy to dominate.
Because policy types change over time during these experiments, resulting parameter values lay between the values that evolved under fixed policies (Tables 4 and 7 ). The changing regime has less intensive stocking policies than the average pastoralist who evolved during the conservation policy, which indicates a more sustainable management style. Moreover, the state of the rangeland during the learning phase remains in a relative good condition (Table 8 ) compared to the average value of the fixed regulator policies (Table 4) . Table 7 were used in a one-property analysis under different policy regimes, each lasting 200 years. Resulting net income and grass biomass levels are presented in Table 9 .
The pastoralist who evolves during changing styles of regulation leads to relatively good levels of income and grass biomass under all three types of regulation. This example shows that an adaptive pattern of policy style prevents extreme good and bad outcomes. On average the income levels of Table 6 and 9, both fixed and changing regulation, are similar. Average grass biomass 220 220 207
Conclusions
The model describes the interactions between grass, trees/shrubs, sheep, pastoralists and the policy environment. We analysed the consequences of these interactions under different policy environments. We were particularly interested in the co-evolution of pastoralists' management styles and governmental policies.
The optimal control experiments show that under the assumptions of the model, including perfect information, a strongly fluctuating stocking density leads to the best financial and ecological consequences. It entails destocking for just long enough to let the grass grow again before re-stocking at a high rate. In mulga, frequently burning to reduce woody weeds contributes to the success of the strategy. The alternating style is a consequence of the lag effects in the ecological system.
Experiments with the adaptive agents version of the model show that each policy has different financial and ecological consequences. Regulation reduces the learning process but keeps the rangeland in relatively good condition while the limited learning occurs. This is especially true for mulga. The regulation process in the conservation regime keeps the system in reasonably good condition during the 200-year period but the pastoralist that evolved under the free market regime outperforms this 'conservation' pastoralist. The stability regime was not successful in keeping the rangeland in good condition, and reduced the learning rate of pastoralists. In general, the average pastoralist that evolves earns about 40% and 30% lower income in the mulga and chenopod rangeland compared to the respective optimal solutions. This is an estimate of the cost of managing under uncertainty and is in line with empirical case studies McKean et al. (1998) of differences in returns from ranges in high variable climate and stable climate conditions.
When the regulator is allowed to change there is an alternation between regulator styles as the system agents and policies adapt to changes in grass biomass and the loss of economic opportunities. The changes in regulation are triggered by surprises of high wool prices (the style changes to free market) and drought periods (change to conservation). Consumption levels are more stable in the adaptive than in the optimising model, and rangeland condition is maintained.
These results are preliminary. A program for developing the potential of this approach is likely to include: The system can be confronted with many surprises, such as low wool prices, drought, changing sheep prices, changing interest rates, and so on. This may affect the behaviour of the pastoralists in such a way that the government has to change its regulatory procedures to allow the pastoralists to survive. These changes in regulation should be chosen with care since they may also reduce the ability of the pastoralists to learn, which is likely to reduce the resilience of the system as a whole. A simulation model as discussed in this paper, which is clearly only a caricature of the real complex system, might nevertheless be a tool that enables us to analyse the system characteristics of alternative management strategies. One of the big challenges of this type of model is to design institutional regimes that balance ability to learn, returns from the rangeland, and condition of the ecosystem.
Finally, this type of modelling may provide additional insights compared with the optimal control models from economics, and the detailed bottom up models from ecology. It integrates the important elements of managing real complex ecosystems. This type of modelling therefore provides an interesting approach to the science of integration, and to the development of promi sing management and policy strategies.
